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Instrumentalisation of and by Migration Law. 
Instrumentalisation and Private International Law. 
 
 “How liberal should we be ?” This seems to be one of the main 
questions Private International Law (“PIL”) is nowadays confronted 
with within the European context. As explained by prof. Meeusen, the 
principle of freedom of movement of EU-citizens pushes international 
family law into a process of liberalization. The awareness that 
mobility of European citizens within the Union can be influenced by 
the way people weigh the pros and cons of the impact of mobility on 
the regulation of their family life, spurs the elaboration of a liberal 
European international family law. Apparently European authorities 
are convinced that a liberal system of PIL could stimulate freedom of 
movement, and from there we can see interventions in PIL as well by 
the Court of Justice as by the European legislator. 
 
In the media, incidently rather sensational examples of the issues at 
stake come forward, e.g. the issue of same-sex-marriages, in particular 
the problems non-recognition of these marriages in a European 
country might cause for EU-citizens who make use of their right of 
freedom of movement. But these days, another kind of issues of 
“mobility” and migration obviously gets much more attention in the 
media, namely migration “coming from outside Europe”. And in fact, 
if one looks closer, dynamics going on in this context, also reflect on 
PIL, pull to it, and try to instrumentalize it. 
 
In the context of confrontation with migration coming from outside 
the union, the main question seems to be “how restrictive can we be 
?”, in particular how restrictive can we be in legislating on residence 
claims, social security claims, nationality claims of non-occidental 
foreigners. The dynamic of restriction is obvious. What is more: legal 
interventions are flanked by the divulgation of ideologies justifying 
these changes, ideologies calling up to go even further in restricting 
claims of foreigners. It has become meanstream to pretend that in the 
past, foreigners were given too much rights, that authorities were too 
soft in dealing with abuses and fraud and that now the time has come 
to change rules and apply rules in a tougher way, for the own sake of 
foreigners; it has become meanstream to pretend that having a double 
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appartenance is not really possible, and certainly not something 
desirable; it has become meanstream to argue that so-called cultural or 
religious problems such as unequality of men and women are to be 
seen as main causes of integration problems, … Such a presentation 
and problematization certainly influences the way one will be inclined 
to act, intervene, legislate. This kind of meanstreaming is very present 
in the Netherlands. In fact, I always feel disappointed when I see that 
Belgium often takes the Netherlands as an example and a model to 
follow in this context. I think one actually is rather in need of 
demystification of these ideas.   
 
As far as it concerns the Netherlands, I recently contributed to a 
project coordinated by the Dutch Family Council, with other people 
such as Sarah van Walsum. In one of my contributions to this project, 
I also dealt with the question how migration law ànd ideologies going 
along with a restrictive migration policy influence other areas of law. 
One of the questions addressed was whether the way different areas of 
law interplay, such as the interplay between family law, migration law 
and social security law, leads to a weakening of the situation of 
foreigners. And indeed, this appears to happen, rules in some areas of 
law appear to function as a spoilsport for claims in other areas of law. 
I refer to the book for concrete examples. I also included in this 
publication the discipline of PIL as a case-study of the dynamic on 
how migration law and migration policy influences other areas of law 
and weaken the position of foreigners. In fact, it appears quickly that 
the way PIL-rules are promulgated and applied could weaken in an 
indirect way the position of foreigners. Because in regulating 
mobility, residence, social security and nationality issues of 
foreigners, one is inevitably confronted with the intricacies of PIL. For 
example, the recognition of a foreign marriage or of a foreign 
judgment containing a change of age of a foreigner – both typical 
issues of PIL – could be decisive in evaluating a residence claim or a 
retirement claim; Thus PIL in reality often functions as a building 
stone and a hinge between family law and other areas of law: so e.g. it 
is not the field of PIL that determines whether one can ascribe 
residence  claims based on certain family relationships or not; but 
when a decision in migration law has been taken that under certain 
circumstances, a marriage could lead to a residence claims, PIL rules 
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could become crucial, as they can decide whether e.g. a marriage 
created abroad should be recognized or not.  
 
Now it appears that rules of PIL could be manipulated in the sense 
that they are promulgated or applied in a way ensuring a negative 
effect for foreigners. If such a kind of manipulation takes place in one 
way or another, one could speak of a kind of instrumentalization of 
PIL for restrictive migration policy. Eight years ago, I finished my 
PhD in Belgium in a rather dramatic way, by warning for the negative 
instrumentalisation of PIL for objectives of restrictive migration law. I 
really feared this, but perhaps it was mainly attractive to write this, as 
it may sound interesting and dramatic to do so. Nowadays, 8 years 
later, I believe the phenomenon of instrumentalisation of PIL for 
restrictive migration policy should still not be overestimated, and thus 
perhaps talking about this may still seem more dramatic that it is. But 
however, after migrating from Belgium to the Netherlands and 
studying Dutch PIL, over the past years I could find more and more 
incidents and illustrations of this phenomenon. Where ifl issues 
involve non-european foreigners, Dutch authorities sometimes tend to 
use ifl-rules in such a way as to prevent non-european migrants from 
claiming residence, social security and nationality, and so as to 
selectively restrict the mobility of non-European foreigners. I have 
described and criticized these incidents in several publications in a 
rather technical way. Today, I only speak in a more general, perhaps 
even rather political way.    
 
But in any case, examples of instrumentalization can be found as well 
in Dutch legislation as in Dutch jurisprudence. There are of course 
counterexamples to be given, and sometimes practices even change in 
a positive way, but the main tendency appears to be a tendency of 
restricting claims of foreigners, with an echo in PIL. In PIL-debates, 
one could also find echos of the ideologies going on today. There is 
eg., as I mentioned, this overwhelming presentation of fraud, a clear 
call to combat fraud, and the question how PIL should deal with 
allegations of fraud; there are the ideas about predominance of non-
occidental men and subordination of women. Here one often thinks of 
issues such as repudiation and polygamy. But I think that it is 
interesting to mention here, as a kind of a striking example of what 
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happens in reality, that in the Netherlands eg. for several years several 
Moroccon men were, through rules of PIL, completely blocked in 
their efforts to divorce from their women who wouldn’t agree to 
divorce; a repudiation was not recognised because the women didn’t 
accept the repudiation, but at the same time a “Dutch” divorce wasn’t 
offered to them; one case had to go up to the hightest Dutch court 
before these men could divorce. The example seems striking to me, 
mainly in a Dutch context, because in the Netherlands both men and 
women can, in fact, divorce without the consentement of the partner, 
but these Moroccon men were in fact blocked in a marriage. 
 
In fact, more generally spoken, I think that in general foreigners, both 
women and men, are nowadays in several ways more and more 
blocked and destabilized in the organization of their family life, they 
have less and less choices on how to organize their family life. And I 
fear that rules of PIL too often contribute to the further complication 
of their life.  
 
While the life of these foreigners becomes more and more 
complicated, I remind at the same time the ambition of European 
authorities, as they expressed it themselves, to “make easier” the life 
of European citizens, through PIL. Making European citizen’s life 
easier, seems to require a unification of PIL in a liberalizing way. 
Personally, I have sympathy for the process, judged on its own merits, 
of liberalization of international family law that takes place under 
European impulses. I realize that the process of liberalization can’t be, 
and shouldn’t be, without any limit, but in its essence I think it is a 
good evolution as evaluated from its substance, as I am in favor of 
tendencies of liberalization and as I think basic PIL concerns about 
e.g. international harmony, no-loss-of-rights, legal security, non-
discrimination, finally and basically fit well in a tendency to stimulate 
mobility of people. At the same time, seeing what is going on in 
European PIL, I also have hope that the dynamics going on within the 
European context could have a wider positive effect. In fact, European 
interferences with PIL could possibly also influence PIL in general, 
e.g. through argumentations based on the indirect effect of European 
law, or argumentations based on the need of consistency of PIL. If this 
effect does not take place, or if only a limited category of people could 
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pull up themselves to the European dynamics, ultimately we could be 
confronted with the emergence of a kind of double-track policy in the 
process of dealing with PIL: liberalizing tendencies in PIL as opposed 
to restrictive tendencies, in parallel with current two-track policies in 
migration law itself, in fact as an echo and amplification of migration 
law itself. Ultimately, one could imagine that the EU’s interference 
with PIL itself would be a double-track one, depending on the nature 
of the case – purely intracommunitarian or including external aspects, 
to the extent that the EU would interfere with PIL in cases having 
“external aspects”. In fact, since the EU has enlarged its competency 
over immigration law and PIL and aims to unify rules on issues as 
“family reunification” of non-European immigrants, interference of 
the EU in PIL issues that are not purely “intracommunitarian” 
becomes conceivable. This raises the possibility that actual tendencies 
in national ways of dealing with PIL, going along with restrictive 
migration policy, may be the precursors of future European practices. 
It is also conceivable that the elaboration of a “liberal” system of 
European PIL will undergo a “backlash” under the influence of 
concerns that are currently perceptible on a national level. Seen this 
way, PIL finds itself in fields of forces about competence, substance 
and political influences on the discipline. 
 
Of course, one could pretend that it is quite logic that politics, 
including migration policies, which have been generally accepted 
have an effect on several areas of law, including a discipline such as 
PIL. Each discipline should thus just do its own bit, one could say. 
Moreover, it is not quite new or unique that tendencies of 
instrumentalization for political goals are felt in PIL. It is e.g. striking 
that actually, in the Netherlands, right now legislation is prepared to 
make PIL even useful in combating terrorism, namely through 
adaptation of PIL-rules on international company law and non-
governmantal organizations. There are also older examples. I remind 
for example discussions in Dutch PIL on how PIL could contribute to 
combat environment pollution. In the 90’, a book on this issue of 
environment pollution and PIL was published under the title 
“pollution in PIL”. So, the issue of instrumentalisation of PIL isn’t 
quite unique or new, but still, I think that as far as it concerns the 
intrumentalisation of PIL for restrictive migration policy, it is a 
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specific one. As far as one would present this instrumenatlisation as a 
kind of interest analysis of governments, this should be seen as a 
particular way of weighing interests of states: states influence the way 
international family law is ruled out and applied from the interest they 
have in the effect the existence of the international family relationship 
will have on a public claim, based on this family relationship.  
 
I think that if restrictive migration law effects PIL, we can speak of a 
real “pollution” of PIL, which should be regarded in a negative way. 
Not only because I think the restrictive migration policy itself and 
ideologies going along with this policy are to be critised, and PIL 
should at least not collaborate with this policy, but also because I 
think aims of restrictive migration policy in any case basically don’t 
fit at all with principles of PIL; moreover, manipulating PIL for 
objectives of restrictive migration policy constitutes a rather tricky 
kind of frustrating claims and sometimes even frustrating respect for 
human rights such as the protection of family life. If one says that if a 
person is married, he or she should enjoy protection of family life, this 
right could be frustrated through the subtle application of rules of PIL 
dealing with the definition of marriage in an international context. 
 
Concluding. In the Netherlands, we can see nowadays both direct 
attacks and indirect attacks on claims of foreigners. Some are justified 
on a so-called humanitarian basis, some are presented just as rude as 
they are. Sometimes I think one should focus on the direct attacks, 
rather than the rather hidden ones. But finally, I think it is important to 
criticize measures, if they are not right, both if they are presented on a 
humanitarian basis or on a xenophobical basis, both measures and 
practices frustrating directly claims, and the indirect ones, e.g. through 
practices in which PIL is used in a tricky way to frustrate claims. The 
indirect ones are often a reflection of the direct ones. What is more: as 
the indirect ones often transform claims which foreigners should still 
be able to invoke into pure optical effects, they often deprive 
foreigners even from the claims which finally still seem to be left for 
them. 
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